El Alamein Page 13

  6 August

  Whilst I was dressing and practically naked, the PM suddenly burst into my room. Very elated and informed me that his thoughts were taking shape and that he would soon commit himself to paper! I rather shuddered and wondered what he was up to!41

  Churchill had never liked the Auchinleck/Montgomery combination. Now his plan was to give Brooke Montgomery as Eighth Army commander – with Brooke as C-in-C of a ‘Near East Command’. Auchinleck would be given a new Persia–Iraq Command (confusingly termed ‘Middle East Command’) instead. Gott did not feature in this at all, although presumably Churchill still had an army in mind for him. Thwarted by Brooke’s polite declining of a second appointment in 48 hours, Churchill tried a new tack that evening, sending for Brooke to hear the decisions he had reached, guided by discussions with Smuts. Churchill had drafted a telegram to the War Cabinet recommending a splitting of Middle East Command in two with Auchinleck to be C-in-C of the new command. General the Honourable Sir Harold Alexander was to take over the ‘Near East Command,’ with Gott commanding Eighth Army. There were other purges including removal of the commander of XXX Corps, Ramsden, the diminutive Corbett and Dorman-Smith.

  Brooke concurred and the telegram was dispatched. Churchill was unaware, however, that it had been Brooke who had persuaded Smuts of the virtues of Alexander as the new C-in-C. The CIGS was learning how to exercise a degree of control over the Prime Minister. He could not have predicted how fate would now intervene. Having been told of his new appointment, on the afternoon of 7 August Gott flew back to Cairo in a Bristol Bombay transport of 216 Squadron flown by 19-year old Sergeant Hugh ‘Jimmy’ James. His intention was to take a few days’ leave. However, the aircraft, crew and its passengers had the misfortune to encounter Messerschmitt Bf-109s from Jagdgeschwader 27 led by Leutnant Emil Clade. The transport plane was forced down and then attacked on the ground by Feldwebel Bernd Schneider. Although Sergeant James and three others survived, Gott and fifteen of the passengers died when the plane caught fire.

  When he heard the news, Brooke was horrified at losing one of the ‘linkpins’ of the planned changes. However, on later reflection, ‘it seemed almost like the hand of God suddenly appearing to set matters right where we had gone wrong’.42 Once more Brooke benefited from Smuts’ support in convincing Churchill to select Montgomery, and a telegram was duly dispatched summoning him to Cairo. The War Cabinet’s chief objection in all this seemed to be the nomenclature – Middle East Command remained and the new one was called Persia–Iraq Command.43

  The following day, 8 August, Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Jacob was sent to Eighth Army Headquarters with a letter from Churchill advising Auchinleck of the decision to replace him as C-in-C and offering him the Persia–Iraq Command. Auchinleck took time to consider this offer, but ultimately rejected it. This decision has subsequently been criticized as an emotional response – a fit of pique at losing both the Eighth Army and Middle East Command. In fact, as Jacob’s account of their meeting makes clear, Auchinleck had clear reasons for not accepting the appointment, which he never veered from:

  I felt as if I were just going to murder an unsuspecting friend… I handed the C-in-C the letter I had brought. He opened it and read it through two or three times in silence. He did not move a muscle, and remained outwardly calm, and in complete control of himself. He then asked me whether it was intended that Persia should be under India… He felt that sooner or later they would inevitably come under India… He was convinced that he could not accept what was offered. He had been C-in-C, India and C-in-C, Middle East, and now he was asked to take a position which was virtually that of one of his own Army commanders. The fact that he was being moved would indicate to the Army that he had lost the confidence of the Government, and had failed in his task… He had always determined, when his time came, to set his face against accepting any sop. I felt bound to say that I had never imagined that he would take up any other attitude, and that I had told the CIGS this straight… I could not have admired more the way General Auchinleck received me, and his attitude throughout. A great man and a great fighter.44

  Brooke, on the other hand, thought he was ‘behaving like an offended film star’.45

  It was a harsh judgement on a man who had performed more than adequately in both roles in which the crisis occasioned by Rommel’s offensive had required him to serve. He had not failed as an army commander. Indeed, he had decisively beaten Rommel during the fighting around Alamein in early July. There had been no suggestion of failure as C-in-C, although there was concern about possible future direction – especially the possibility of Corbett being given Eighth Army.

  By working in a dual role, Auchinleck had encouraged Churchill to concatenate the positions of Eighth Army commander and C-in-C, whereas his real concern was for an energetic fighting army commander to defeat Rommel – what else mattered but beating him? Here was where the change was needed – as Auchinleck also admitted. However, it was Brooke who perceived, probably correctly on the balance of evidence, that it was time for a change. With his vision of a British war-winning strategy mapped out, Brooke pursued a combination of new commanders who he believed could realize his vision in North Africa. Ultimately, this path led to General the Hon. Sir Harold Alexander and Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery.

  Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander arrived in Egypt with an impressive record of service in both the Great War and the Second World War. Commissioned in the Irish Guards, he had ended the first war as an acting brigadier-general, having been twice wounded and awarded a Military Cross and a DSO. In 1940 he had been a divisional commander at Dunkirk and responsible for the withdrawal of all British forces that could be saved. He had performed this role skilfully and effectively. With a reputation, therefore, as a good man for a crisis, he had been sent in February 1942 to Burma where he had organized the evacuation of Rangoon and the withdrawal into India. As the new C-in-C, Middle East, he was satisfied to learn that Montgomery, with whom he had been both friend and military colleague for many years, was to command Eighth Army.

  Bernard Law Montgomery had been an officer in the Royal Warwickshire Regiment on the outbreak of the First World War. Wounded in 1914, he subsequently served as a brigade, corps and divisional staff officer. His official biographer has wrongly credited him with writing one of the most important of the British Expeditionary Force’s multiplicity of training documents, produced as the army strove to ‘learn the lessons of the fighting’ and master the greatest military conflict in which British forces have ever been involved.46 It was actually in the inter-war years that Montgomery developed a reputation as a trainer. This period included time as an instructor at the Staff College, where he worked alongside Alan Brooke, and work for the War Office in revising the Infantry Training manual. On the outbreak of the Second World War he was a divisional commander whose confident and capable performance in France in 1940 was noted and remembered by his corps commander, Brooke. As a corps commander himself in Britain, he fell out with his superior, Auchinleck, and the resulting feud was never resolved. It was, therefore, undoubtedly pleasing for him that he was replacing his rival.

  Montgomery benefited greatly from Alexander’s support and confidence. Had he been required to deal with many of the matters Auchinleck had in his dual role, Montgomery’s abrasive personality would probably have seen him fail. Instead, he could concentrate on Eighth Army, and especially in using the opportunity now offered by the exhaustion of both sides for training (which was always necessary even in well-organized and established formations) to continue the reorganization that was already under way. Meanwhile, Alexander adopted a policy of non-interference, although he ensured he was kept informed of Montgomery’s plans and the latter duly ensured that he sought appropriate approval for his intentions. The time was right for change, if a change was needed. The perception was that it was needed – that was what counted in the end.

  The ‘Cairo Purge’ continued with the departures of Corbett and Dorman-Smit
h and the promotion of McCreery to be Alexander’s CGS. With this shake-up in the High Command came Churchill’s attempt to provide focus to the new leadership pairing. George Davy recorded:

  The Prime Minister was still in Cairo and almost my first job was to translate his instruction to Alex into an instruction from Alex to Monty. Like his notes of my statistics, the original was written on a sheet of embassy writing paper and was in two short paragraphs. The first served as Alex’s instruction to Monty without the alteration of a word: ‘Your prime and main duty will be to take or destroy at the earliest opportunity the German-Italian Army commanded by the Field-Marshal Rommel, together with all its supplies and establishments in Egypt and Libya.’ The second paragraph referred to ‘such other duties as pertain to your (i.e. Alex’s) command’, subject to the paramount importance of para 1. This part did not have to be put into the instruction to Monty.47

  Alexander was not to take over from Auchinleck until 15 August, so it was from the latter that Montgomery received his instructions on his arrival on 12 August. The meeting was not officially minuted so what passed between the two men is unknown, but Auchinleck’s professionalism would have ensured he briefed Montgomery on the latest Eighth Army plans including those for possible resumption of an offensive. In addition, Montgomery had access to all the recent appreciations, reports on operations and correspondence relating to the conduct of operations in the desert. These he had thoroughly digested.

  After seeing Auchinleck, Montgomery met Alexander and John Harding (now Deputy Chief of General Staff). He asked Harding to produce plans for a strong armoured formation akin to the Afrika Korps to act as a spearhead for future operations. This formation he termed a ‘corps de chasse’; it was intended to comprise two armoured divisions and one of mobile infantry. That evening Harding outlined how this would be formed from 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions with 2nd New Zealand Division – the latter with 9th Armoured Brigade as an integral component. This last element mirrored Auchinleck’s scheme which McCreery had disputed.

  The following day, at Eighth Army Headquarters, Montgomery outlined his view on the current situation and his plans to his staff. He had already made a strong impression on Guingand by his observations on Eighth Army’s need for a clear lead and a firm grip from the top for the creation of a winning team. Now he explained how this would be achieved. His first concern was with the atmosphere in which staff, commanders and troops would live, work and fight. In his view, doubt and loss of confidence were prevalent, with some looking back to select the next place to withdraw. There were ‘desperate defence measures’ under way to prepare positions in Cairo and the Delta. All this was to cease.

  Critical to the new ‘atmosphere’ were his next observations:

  The defence of Egypt lies here at Alamein and on the Ruweisat Ridge. What is the use of digging trenches in the Delta? It is quite useless; if we lose this position we lose Egypt; all the fighting troops now in the Delta must come here at once, and will. Here we will stand and fight; there will be no further withdrawal. I have ordered that all plans and instructions dealing with further withdrawal are to be burnt, and at once. We will stand and fight here. If we can’t stay here alive, then let us stay here dead.48

  This was classic motivational speaking by a skilled orator. Strategically, this approach was ridiculous. Measures for the defence of Cairo and the Delta remained in place. Churchill even intervened to influence the contingency plans at the end of the month by placing General Maitland Wilson, who took the Persia–Iraq Command refused by Auchinleck, in charge of Cairo’s defence.49 If Rommel did attack, and break through, Montgomery’s words would have meant nothing. Eighth Army would have fallen back on the Delta and, if necessary, beyond. Montgomery would have been required to preserve Eighth Army ‘in being’ in that process. But, as an exemplar of inspirational rhetoric, his speech did touch a chord with its audience, who could see the value in the simple message and relayed it to the men they commanded without issues about comprehension. The speech’s principal contribution, therefore, was in terms of its influence on morale – many men mentioned it when writing letters home, for example.50 It certainly removed any concern about confused thinking.

  Montgomery also explained that fresh divisions and weapons were arriving from Britain along with reinforcements for the existing units. Between 300 and 400 Sherman tanks were being unloaded at Suez. (On this, he was mistaken; one of Corbett’s last duties as CGS had been to tell Churchill these tanks would be about three weeks late). He was confident in the case of an attack by ‘Wommel’ (Montgomery had a slight speech impediment) and his plans for an attack would ‘hit Rommel and his Army for six right out of Africa’ but he was determined not to attack until he was ready. He would not tolerate ‘belly aching’ or excuse-making, expecting his orders to be swiftly obeyed.

  It is difficult to know what to make of Montgomery’s next remarks. Certainly, they must have bemused some amongst the Eighth Army staff:

  I have little more to say just at present. And some of you may think it is quite enough and may wonder if I am mad. I assure you I am quite sane. I understand there are people who often think I am slightly mad; so often that I now regard it rather a compliment. All I have to say to that is that if I am slightly mad, there are a large number of people I could name who are raving lunatics.51

  A strange mix of eccentricity and paranoia, with a degree of challenge and irreverence – all of which may have passed for humour with Montgomery. Fortunately, he soon returned to more familiar themes, including an important desire for all soldiers to understand what they were required to do. It was perceptive of Montgomery to see that from this a ‘surge of confidence throughout the Army’ would result.

  A move of Eighth Army Headquarters was also outlined. Montgomery had no time for Auchinleck’s desire to share the conditions of his men and endure the hardships and privations they endured. He would not be sleeping in a ‘fleabag’ under the stars. Instead, his headquarters would be:

  a decent place where we can live in reasonable comfort and where the Army Staff can all be together and side by side with the HQ of the Desert Air Force. This is a frightful place here, depressing, unhealthy and a rendezvous for every fly in Africa; we shall do no good work here. Let us get over there by the sea where it is fresh and healthy. If officers are to do good work they must have decent messes, and be comfortable.52

  This is especially ironic given that Montgomery was a critic of the ‘chateau generalship’ of the Great War. In fact, the new headquarters at Burg-el-Arab were further behind the front line than Haig’s GHQ at Montreuil but, like Haig, whose position was actually more closely analogous to Alexander’s, Montgomery made use of modern transport to maintain a Tactical Headquarters closer to his subordinate commanders. For Haig’s train, Montgomery substituted staff cars and later tanks. The move to re-establish physical proximity with the Desert Air Force Headquarters was sensible and demonstrated a desire to improve inter-service relations.

  Montgomery now embarked on daily tours of his command, attempting to see as many units as he could. This was a first opportunity for many of them to see him – although some knew him from their time in Britain before coming to the desert. John Harding recalled:

  He went round and saw everybody. They saw him. He told them what was what and what they had to do and why. This is the way to get morale going the right way. He was brilliant at carrying people with him by explaining to them what was going to happen: what was planned and then, of course, by carrying it out.53

  For those who did not know him, his extraordinary abrasive self-confidence was a shock – as was his appearance, which was very different to the patriarchal Auchinleck. Brigadier Philip (‘Pip’) Roberts of 22nd Armoured Brigade remembered:

  Within two days of his arrival General Montgomery had toured the whole front and visited all the units in it. I well remember my first meeting with him; he and the new Corps Commander, General Horrocks, were to meet me at a certain point on the Alam H
alfa Ridge at 0845 hours. At 0830 being afflicted with gyppy-tummy I felt there was just time to disappear over the nearest ridge with a spade, and plodding my way back a few minutes later complete with spade I saw a large cortege arriving at the appointed spot and some 5 minutes ahead of schedule. There was General Horrocks, XIII Corps Commander, whom I saluted, there were Bobbie Erskine, Brigadier General Staff, XIII Corps, and Freddie de Guingand, Chief of Staff, Eighth Army and several other characters including a little man with white knobbly knees, an Australian hat and no badges of rank who I took to be a newly arrived war correspondent. Monty, whom I had not previously met, was obviously going to arrive later. I was just about to ask Freddie de Guingand from which direction the Army Commander might be expected when the gentleman in the Australian hat said to me ‘Do you know who I am?’– ‘Yes, Sir,’ was the prompt reply. It was quite clear that whoever he was it was better to know! And, of course, it was Monty.54

  On 14 August, whilst visiting 24th Australian Infantry Brigade Montgomery had accepted an Australian slouch hat as alternative headgear to his traditional general’s hat. The gesture was popular with the Australians. It suggested a degree of non-conformity on their new Army Commander’s part. But, even so, some in the ranks were less impressed, including Warrant Officer Eric Watts of 2/12th Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery:

  We were told about him. He did come round to the gun positions. We used to think he looked terrible. He was a slight, thin-faced man and the Australians were big, stronger-looking – I’m not saying that he wasn’t, he was obviously pretty fit. But he wore one of these turned-up hats and he looked terrible in it because nobody can wear a turned-up hat like an Australian. But he knew he had the Australian forces under him and he wanted to look like them and I suppose it meant something to him. He wanted to indicate to us that he could wear an Australian hat. But, anyway, it was a morale-builder and the fact was that he was round the gun positions. A very short visit too it was. He was just in and out, talked to the officers and then off again because he had a fair area to cover. He was just more or less there to say ‘Look I’m the new boy on the block. I’m the bloke that’s going to be responsible for what happens now and I want you to know what the situation is.’55