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  Fisher’s decision and Archer-Shee’s prompt action fortunately paid off, as 10th Hussars’ Sergeant Douglas Covill recounted:

  He said ‘Disperse!’ but we said ‘We can’t – it’s a minefield’ and he said ‘Bugger the mines! It’s better to go in and get out. You’re right in line. We’ve got to get off the track’. Well, luckily it was a dummy minefield – they weren’t proper mines – so we then dispersed into the ‘alleged minefield’ and opened up.44

  All three regiments did likewise. As daylight came they saw the ground ahead rising for almost two miles forming what became known as Kidney Ridge – from which the German 88mm guns now began to open fire. The Priest SP guns, Shermans and Grants with their ability to fire high explosive (HE) shells indirectly were all soon in action and remained so throughout the day in a slogging attritional fight.

  In the southern ‘corridor’ it was the New Zealanders’ own attached armour, 9th Armoured Brigade, with the Wiltshire Yeomanry out in front, that got into action on Miteirya Ridge first but suffered heavily when they went into an uncharted minefield. The remaining Wiltshires, the Warwickshire Yeomanry and 3rd Hussars with the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry Regiment all took up position behind the ridge crest in support of the infantry.

  In the same divisional sector, Peter Moore had witnessed the immediate tank losses suffered by the Sherwood Rangers of 8th Armoured Brigade as they emerged from the ‘Boat’ minefield gap. When he and his men had withdrawn, the fight between tanks firing almost ‘blind’ at gun flashes and the anti-tank guns continued, as Arthur Reddish described:

  In a very short time, 16 tanks out of the original 44 had been lost. With dawn breaking and much of the armour still head to tail in the narrow lane of the minefield, orders came to withdraw. At daylight, the tanks in the minefield would have been sitting ducks. We withdrew in good order without further tank losses, but a gun-towing vehicle was lost. Evacuation of the wounded took some time.45

  It was a similar story for the Staffordshire Yeomanry on ‘Bottle’ track. They too went into hull-down positions behind the ridge. ‘Hat’ track did not extend as far forward as ‘Boat’ and ‘Bottle’. Consequently, 3rd RTR remained further back, whilst coming up behind them was 24th Armoured Brigade, including Alf Flatow’s 45th RTR:

  The march along ‘Hat’ track was the same as all the other night marches we had done so many times before – the clouds of choking sand dust which got in the eyes and mouth, the difficulty of driving caused by this, the tanks getting spread out and losing touch and then catching up with each other again: wireless silence ‘until first contact’ (how often that expression had been used parrot-like on all exercises and schemes). According to orders we expected to push through the minefields that night and make a thrust at the enemy but the unexpected strength of the enemy’s defences foiled this plan. However we were all keyed up for this and I got out a ‘Mills’ bomb and put it on a ledge inside my cupola. Corporal Hudson my gunner was dozing inside the turret just under this ledge and the tank going over a ditch or hole caused the bomb to fall off the ledge and crack onto Hudson’s head. Poor man it gave him a hell of a start and we had a few awkward seconds grovelling in the bottom of the turret trying to retrieve it and hoping the pin hadn’t been knocked out en route!46

  Halting at the entrance to the last British minefields, 45th RTR soon heard news that the advance had been held up and that any further progress was impossible. Flatow continued:

  Our introduction to war was therefore rather in the form of ringside spectators. We didn’t know when we would be ordered to advance and we were all rather excited and jumping about. Apparently ‘Hat’ gap was now impassable due to enemy pressure and strength of defences – New Zealand wounded were coming through now and as we moved off the shelling – both ours and the enemy – increased. It was all rather depressing as by this time according to the orders the whole Brigade should have been through the enemy minefields chasing his armour – if any!47

  Dawn brought the fullest indication of the incredible congestion of tanks, guns, men and vehicles in the ‘corridors’ – particularly at Miteirya. Nevertheless, the ground gained needed to be held to precipitate the ‘crumbling’ operations envisaged by Montgomery. The 10th Armoured Division commander, Major-General Alec Gatehouse, an energetic, courageous and determined leader, surely had this in mind when he informed the New Zealand Division’s headquarters of his plans to stay hull-down behind the ridge during daylight and only intervene if there was an Axis counter-attack. His decision was based on a personal reconnaissance witnessed by Brigadier McMeekan:

  General Gatehouse roared by with his Tac. HQ in three Crusaders. The General, looking larger than ever in his white sheepskin coat and black beret, was sitting calmly on top of his tank. He went right up to the ridge, and toured round to see the situation. It was an encouraging sight, and a well-timed visit.48

  This information did not reach Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg immediately because there was no direct wireless link between their respective Tactical Headquarters. Consequently, Freyberg whose experiences in two wars had undoubtedly conditioned him against inactivity and indecision in battle, spent much time urging his staff to energize 10th Armoured into attacks in broad daylight. On what grounds Freyberg could argue that such attacks should be attempted with a realistic chance of success is not clear. He believed he was executing Montgomery’s orders, just as Gatehouse did. Eighth Army instructions for X Corps had been to ‘bring on an armoured battle where full use could be made of British armour and armament to destroy the enemy’ and, otherwise, to ‘prevent the enemy’s armour from interfering with XXX Corps’ operations’.49 Disputes sprang in part from the dichotomy between the quick, decisive breakthrough Montgomery originally conceived and the ‘methodical destruction’ of his revised plan.

  Freyberg is often regarded as sans peur et sans reproche in the Desert War historiography – Montgomery’s best divisional commander, the defender of Crete, several times wounded and a Victoria Cross winner in the Great War. On 24 October, he was definitely wrong in attempting to dictate to the armoured unit commanders (both Briggs and Lumsden had also decided to stand in readiness for counter-attack rather than press on). The difficulty for Lumsden et al was that his opinions carried weight with the Army Commander.

  During the course of the morning, a series of meetings between various corps, divisional and brigade commanders took place. In these, the all-important role of Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese as a corps commander was well-demonstrated. Discussion with Freyberg, Briggs and Gatehouse produced an agreed plan for action by infantry, with support of tanks from three armoured brigades (9th, 8th and 24th). Crucially, Leese committed all his corps artillery to support the effort. He then secured Montgomery’s backing for the scheme and prompted him to issue clear verbal orders regarding planned operations to get the armoured divisions out into the open as soon as possible. This, and a face-to-face meeting with Lumsden, clarified X Corps’ role in operations. The result was that Briggs also chivvied Fisher to get into action and for his tanks to press on whatever the casualties. In the afternoon, this in turn led to a failed attempt by 9th Lancers to get forward.

  The troops in the forward battle were certainly not inactive throughout the day. First the dawn allowed the anti-tank guns to get to work properly, as Anthony Wingfield observed:

  The improvement of visibility inevitably produced anti-tank fire at a target of so many tanks herded together. Several 88mms opened up on A and C Squadrons; but both Douglas Kaye and George Errington were excellent at spotting which of their tanks was being ‘ranged’ upon and ordering it to move in time. The enemy anti-tank gunners were engaging us at very long range and had the rising sun in their eyes, so fortunately we received no casualties at this stage.50

  Then two Kampfgruppen of 15. Panzer-Division with units of Divisione ‘Littorio’ made their counter-attacks. In the northern sector, the Bays and 10th Hussars of 2nd Armoured Brigade engaged approximately twenty ta
nks. This first combat involving the Shermans was a significant landmark in the Desert War, as Wingfield recorded.

  A little later in the morning some German tanks appeared in front of us and halted about 3,000 yards away. I noted at least one of their new Mark IV ‘Specials’ with its long 75mm gun amongst them. It was now that our new gunnery methods and our new Sherman tanks showed their worth. For, when the German tanks moved forward, both A and C Squadron began to hit their targets and several of the German tanks went up in flames. This was indeed a morale-raising sight, and I felt the Germans were surprised as they turned northwards and moved across our front leaving several wrecks behind.51

  The Sherman’s ability (unlike the Grant) to occupy true hull-down positions, combined with the range of its 75mm guns, meant that German tanks standing off at long-range no longer enjoyed the considerable advantages that had defined their tactics previously.

  The 88s were also more vulnerable now the Priests and Shermans could bring HE fire to bear on them. For the first time, the multi-role 88s were at a disadvantage because of their use as both anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Wingfield continued:

  The next appearance on the scene was the RAF. A squadron of Bostons flew over us to decant their bombs accurately on the enemy’s forward positions. Up went the barrels of the 88s to fire at the Bostons, for they are AA [anti-aircraft] as well as anti-tank guns. This gave our tank commanders an excellent chance of pin-pointing their targets. Squadrons of Bostons or Mitchells then arrived at twenty minute intervals for the rest of the morning and an ad hoc co-operation between them and our tanks in dealing with the 88s was built up.52

  The Desert Air Force’s contribution that day was immense with nearly 1,000 sorties, almost all in support of land operations, and despite two fighter airfields being put out of action by sandstorms.53 Reg Crimp noted:

  Almost continually throughout the day the ‘Boston Bus Service’ – groups of 18 bombers escorted by fighters – is in the sky. Dog-fights develop: lazily swirling silver specks up in the sky, occasional peremptory, wrathful machine-gun burst, and long, deepening drones.54

  To Martin Ranft and his fellow gunners the Bostons were the Stur Achtzehn – the ‘Stubborn Eighteen’.55

  In the southern ‘corridor’, the German and Italian armour also remained at long range, ‘swanning about’, but the exchanges of artillery and tank fire were continuous and death struck randomly and suddenly, as Arthur Reddish found:

  A young tank officer jumped on the side of the tank to converse with our commander. A heavy shell hit the tank, hurtling the officer in the air and depositing him some 20 metres ahead of us. He lay there like a rag doll, with arms and legs at grotesque angles. A sapper took one look at the body and covered it with a blanket. The tank turret was crimson with blood and bits of flesh, bone and clothing were splattered all over the right side of the vehicle. After we’d topped up with petrol and replenished the ammunition, the quartermaster-sergeant arrived with a special ration issue. He tried to wash the blood off the turret, using petrol and hessian rags. But a dirty brown stain remained with that tank for the rest of its days. ‘These things will happen,’ the SQMS said consolingly.56

  Meanwhile, Wimberley’s belief that the missing two companies of 1st Gordons had ‘done their stuff’ to the end, and were on the edge of ‘Aberdeen’, was borne out at noon when it was learnt that they actually were on the ‘Kidney feature’. Charles Barker’s reconnaissance had missed them. Nevertheless, the seeds of an important disagreement concerning this had been sown. Wimberley recorded:

  The [1st] Armoured Division HQ insisted that it was a thousand yards further on than the position of the 1st Gordons’ foremost troops. We said the opposite, and in that waste of sand with few features, and a battle raging, it was not easy to be dogmatic. I felt, all the time, we were right, because we had gone there on foot with pacers on foot and compasses, and behind a timed barrage while the tanks behind us had motored it, out of action. Over the next few days feelings ran high between myself and Fisher, and to a lesser degree with Briggs, as to who was right.57

  In the midst of the British Army’s most significant offensive effort of the war so far, a dispute like this was indicative of significant flaws in relations between infantry and armour and was deleterious to effective co-operation by the two arms. Montgomery’s assumption of command had, seemingly, merely papered over Eighth Army’s long-standing cracks.

  At Panzerarmee Headquarters, Stumme had received fragmentary information piecemeal about the battle’s progress. Initial losses in German and Italian units – three battalions of 62o Reggimento Fanteria ‘Sicilia’ from Divisione ‘Trento’ and a battalion from Panzergrenadier-Regiment 382 in 164. Infanterie-Division were overrun – suggested where the attack’s main effort might be and, consequently, why Mitte and Süd Kampfgruppen of 15. Panzer-Division and Divisione ‘Littorio’ units were used in counter-attacks. With daylight, Stumme went forward accompanied only by his driver and Oberst Andreas Büchting, Armeenachtrichtenführer (army chief signals officer), to the headquarters of 90. leichte-Afrika-Division, to assess the threat to his left flank in the coastal sector. Further forward still, the car and occupants came under fire. Büchting was killed and Stumme suffered a fatal coronary whilst trying to escape. He was reported missing, presumed captured but his body was not found until the next day.

  Without definite news of Stumme’s fate, General der Panzertruppen Wilhelm von Thoma, the Afrika Korps commander, assumed overall command but there was inevitably a hiatus in which definite orders were lacking. Consequently, no other major counter-attacks were made during the day. Stumme and Thoma were both capable and experienced yet, when news of the attack reached OKW, Generalfeldmarschall Keitel promptly telephoned Rommel to ascertain if he was fit enough to return to Africa. Rommel travelled immediately to Wiener Neustadt and, after receiving a personal call that evening from Hitler requesting that he return to duty, set off via Rome on the morning of 25 October.58

  Hitler and the OKW, therefore, demonstrated a rather irrational belief that a physically weak Rommel was a better option than his capable subordinates. However, the fundamental problems of the Panzerarmee were already far beyond anything that any commander, however forceful in personality, could fix simply by his presence. Hitler was prepared to dispatch a sick man to Africa immediately, but for too long both he and Mussolini had been unprepared to provide enough physically fit men and adequate resources for these men to sustain themselves and their weapons in the desert fighting. The Panzerarmee’s severely depleted resources already threatened its survival. Rommel’s return might boost morale but could not fuel tanks, supply gun batteries with ammunition or equip units with motor transport. These were what the Axis forces needed above all.

  The attack by 2nd Seaforths of 51st Division on 24 October demonstrated why night-time was the right time for the infantry in the battle. In it, the advance without artillery or tank support got almost as far as the battalion’s final objective ‘Stirling’. However, the men then had to hang on under heavy fire throughout the rest of the next day, with excessive casualties as a consequence. This suggests that Wimberley was indulging in Great War ‘line straightening’. Indeed, the division as a whole may have been tied too closely to ‘established methods’. All three of its brigade commanders, whilst ‘real fighting soldiers’, were, like Wimberley, veterans of the 1914–18 conflict.59 Given alternative ways of proceeding, namely night operations, this attack and attendant losses might have been avoided.

  The second night’s operations achieved some success but, overall, were a disappointment. On the right, two Australian infantry battalions reached their final Lightfoot objectives, although there were some losses to ‘friendly fire’ when the Valentines of 40th RTR mistook them for Axis troops. The Australians dug in to cover the clearing of four minefield gaps and a lateral track linking them. They were vexed, however, by the arrival of 7th Rifle Brigade and its ‘A’ Echelon vehicles, which could not be dispersed adequately an
d soon attracted attention from the 100/17 howitzers and 75/27 guns of 3o Reggimento Artiglieria. ‘The enemy gunners were not too proud to shoot at sitting ducks.’60 Having seen action in July, 7th Rifle Brigade was not a novice battalion, but its actions were tactically naïve and the result of poor co-ordination at the corps level.61 Corporal Donald Main remembered:

  We were now told to dig in and, remembering the very apt saying ‘dig or die’, we did so. It took me little time to discover that I was on hard rock and I only managed to dig a trench two feet deep. When daylight came we found that we were in an exposed position, being engaged not only from the front but also from the left flank.62

  Despite this, the riflemen remained in position amongst the burning wrecks of their transport.

  In the southern ‘corridor’ 10th Armoured Division’s attempts to get beyond the Miteirya Ridge were ill-starred. The ridge minefields were especially dense and slowed 24th Armoured Brigade. There was greater misfortune for 8th Armoured Brigade on its way forward. Arthur Reddish told the story:

  Both Freyberg’s armour and the Staffordshire Yeomanry got into battle order without hindrance; but not us. As we marshalled our column in the pitch-darkness with lorries in the centre and tanks on the outer, a German plane dropped flares over our positions. Within minutes, the bombers arrived. The first bomb landed on a lorry containing petrol and blazing fuel spewed over a wide area. Our other lorries caught fire and some exploded. The desert was lit up for kilometres around. The conflagration attracted enemy artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire and more bombers. That part of Miteiriya wasn’t the best place to be. Our lorried infantry suffered heavy casualties; we lost our entire transport section and many of its drivers; and some tanks were disabled. Throughout the carnage, our padre and medical officer calmly went about their work, despite their aid post having been put out of action by a direct hit.63