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  The isolated Staffordshire Yeomanry pressed on through the second minefield gap and were joined later by 9th Armoured Brigade. The devastation on the ridge was now such that it prompted a determined and surprising choice by Trooper Ian King of 3rd Hussars, bringing up fuel for the brigade’s tanks:

  On the way, shells were falling in the surrounding minefields which were erupting with numerous explosions. I felt vulnerable in a vehicle containing hundreds of gallons of high octane fuel. All round was the fresh debris of war silhouetted by fires and the flashes of guns and explosions. Some fallen bodies, burnt-out vehicles and some tanks which had gone astray on minefields. To our left were the burning remains of the Notts Sherwood Rangers convoy. There were some 15 vehicle skeletons, some still in flames and others smoking, each vehicle having held either fuel or ammunition. They had been caught on a minefield and shelled. It was then I decided I would take the first chance to get back onto a tank crew; it seemed much less exposed.64

  This devastation and disorganization prompted Brigadier Custance to ask Gatehouse, who also had grave doubts about the second night’s operations, to call off the attack. As a consequence, whilst the infantry, engineers and armour continued struggling forward at Miteirya, a crisis conference was held at 0230hrs at Eighth Army’s Tactical Headquarters. Leese, Lumsden, Guingand and Montgomery were all present.65 Guingand’s observation that such an hour was ‘not a good time to hold a conference’ perhaps hints at Montgomery’s state of mind and demeanour after being disturbed in this way.66

  Whether or not this conditioned his responses, Montgomery (through his Chief of Staff) had an extraordinarily accurate grasp of the current situation at Miteirya (which had improved since Custance first raised concerns). Consequently, no deviation from the original army plan was contemplated and the armoured commanders were ordered to remain determined and resolute. After an acrimonious telephone conversation with Gatehouse during this conference, Montgomery ensured that both corps commanders and Gatehouse were clear about his wishes.

  The chief consequence of all this was not in the short term where, by the morning, 8th Armoured Brigade’s tanks had withdrawn behind the ridge again, but in the longer term. Montgomery’s telephonic instruction (by his own account) to Gatehouse to ‘lead his division from in front and not from behind’67 was an intentional slur on Gatehouse’s undoubted courage and well-known command style which, like that of Currie, Briggs and Lumsden, had been de rigueur for Eighth Army’s armoured commanders for at least two years. In addition, Lumsden via Guingand had brought the problem to Montgomery’s door in the first place. Clearly, the tank generals lacked ‘push’ and determination. Their commander never forgave them. Meanwhile, Freyberg (who possessed the qualities Montgomery valued) insisted that 9th Armoured Brigade stay exposed beyond the minefield gaps for much of 25 October where the continual shelling took its toll and nothing was achieved. Ironically, Custance’s brigade also stayed out, avoiding losses as far as possible by constant and skilful manoeuvring by its tank commanders.

  In the northern ‘corridor’, 2nd Armoured Brigade also tried to progress but met an anti-tank screen containing significant numbers of 88mm guns. Further long-range duelling followed in the course of which a PzKpfw IV was hit and disabled at a distance of more than 4,000 yards by a Sherman gunner – perhaps the finest achievement of the day, feted as 9th Lancers’ ‘best shot of the whole war’ and a definite augury of the armour’s new state of tactical affairs.68 The sparring at distance produced a disconcerting incident for Anthony Wingfield during an impromptu discussion with his regimental commander:

  At that moment the Brigadier drove up in his rather large ‘Grant’ tank and stopped about 20 yards away. There was then a noise like an express train and an object like a Rugby football bounced between us and sailed away into the distance, luckily without exploding. ‘Old Fish’ – Brigadier Fisher – leaned out of his turret and said: ‘How very rude.’67

  That afternoon, the dogged 7th Rifle Brigade had an opportunity to redeem itself when suddenly attacked by about forty PzKpfw IIIs and M13/41s. Corporal Donald Main recalled:

  At the same time a heavy barrage was brought down on our positions, also machine-gun and mortar fire. Since we were in the front with our machine-guns, as the tanks drew closer we had to stop firing and take cover in our slit trenches. Our sixteen six-pounders engaged the tanks, several firing at one particular tank, so that the closest was knocked out fifty yards in front. The Battalion were credited with fourteen tanks. As some of the enemy tanks were hit, the occupants tried to escape through the turrets. One Italian officer was hoisting himself out when a six-pounder hit him in the chest and he literally disintegrated. In front of the stationary tanks were two Italians sitting on the ground. From the right came cries of ‘You rotten Pommie bastards!’ The Australians strongly objected to our knocking out the tanks with six-pounders before they came within range of their two-pounders.70

  The attackers drew off, the 6-pounder’s capabilities clearly demonstrated. A late afternoon attack with the setting sun behind – a favourite tactic of the Afrika Korps – still resulted in heavier losses to the Axis tanks with as many as thirty-nine being claimed as knocked out by the British.

  In the second attack of XIII Corps, 131st Brigade got through, but not beyond, the February minefield because of enemy fire. Dennis Gibbs was there with 1/6th Queen’s Royal Regiment:

  My battalion and the 1/5th Queens on our Brigade front were ordered to ‘try again’. This entailed a very long and noisy night advance and attack – noisy because of the creeping barrage ahead of us, the exploding of mines in the minefields set off by the barrage shells, and the shattering, explosions of the enemy defensive fire directed at us whilst we ploughed through the extensive minefields attempting to keep up with the barrage.71

  Private Jack York was with the other battalion:

  We were well up now behind our barrage, and the ground started to slope towards the enemy. Several times we stumbled into new shell holes reeking with cordite. I could just see the company in front, looking like a black mass in the dim light, when suddenly several mortar bombs descended right among these extended groups, each leaving a large black cloud of smoke hanging above them. Many were the cries and shouts for stretcher bearers then. Still we struggled forward when without warning, the ground was swept like hail with heavy machine gun fire.72

  Frantically, men dug themselves shallow ‘scrapes’ for protection. York continued:

  Unfortunately, the ground was hard and rocky, and at best we only managed to scrape very shallow holes – just enough to give us some protection. Shortly after we heard a sudden explosion behind us, and to our right in the minefield. Looking round I saw a Scorpion [tank] which was soon enveloped in flames. This vividly illuminated that area of the minefield for a time, and it also became the target for several enemy anti-tank guns. Evidently the sappers were working feverishly to clear a gap in the minefield, and we prayed earnestly for their success. We knew that if they completed a gap by first light, the heavy tanks of 7th Armoured Division would then pass through, and rove forward to clear up enemy positions between the two minefields. We would then be able to consolidate, and make our own positions much more secure.73

  Two minefield gaps were cleared, mostly by hand, for Roberts’ 22nd Armoured Brigade advance. York went on:

  Slowly, the long hours of the night wore away, as we laid shivering in the bitter cold. Just before dawn, two soldiers nearby, who started to crawl towards the wire, were told by an officer that he would shoot them unless they returned to their positions. As the first faint light of dawn started to filter down, we heard the roar of tank engines from across the minefield behind us, and the noise gradually increased as four or five tanks approached and passed through the gap, which had been made by the sappers. They had almost made the passage safely – when ‘thump’, ‘thump’, ‘thump’, ‘thump’; the ground shook as four thick black columns [of] smoke shot up near the gap – enemy 88mm anti-tank gu
ns trying to get the range. They continued to fire at intervals, and their shooting soon became very accurate, nearly every shell landing in the gap. We heard some of the tanks turn left, and move across our front, and then start firing at enemy positions. Soon one or two explosions came from their direction and we never heard them moving again. No further tanks tried to force the gap, as the sun came up, and evidently the ones that got through had run onto unmarked mines, or been knocked out by anti-tank fire.74

  The attack stalled. Tank losses alone were enough for 7th Armoured Division’s commander, John Harding, to seek approval for his decision to stop the attack. However, Montgomery insisted that the attackers stay out between the two minefields. This was sheer bloody-mindedness by the Army Commander and hell for the men made to endure there, as York vividly described:

  About 3 o’clock, when we were all feeling parched and constricted, we came under some very heavy machine-gun fire from our own tanks in position across the minefield. They were firing tracer, and the bullets came arching across in a solid sheet, passing above and about our slits with an awe inspiring hiss. As the afternoon hours dragged slowly by, and the relentless sun beat down from a brassy sky, our position seemed desperate. There would be no point in staying in our present position for another night, especially as the tanks could not force the gap. We would either have to attack and overcome the enemy positions that night, or withdraw across that dreadful minefield. An Officer from H.Q. Company then very gallantly and quickly ran across the minefield when one of our armoured cars came right up to the wire, and hastily clambering on to the turret, made good his escape under heavy machine-gun fire. As a result, he was able to put our Commander in the picture regarding our hopeless position.75

  Meanwhile the men’s sufferings would continue.

  With tanks and infantry left occupying exposed positions as a consequence of the night’s operations, and with 51st Division being responsible again for the main offensive endeavours by Eighth Army during the day with a two-battalion attack that finally secured the divisional objectives, the opportunity existed for Thoma to take back the initiative with determined action designed to seal off Eighth Army’s bridgeheads in the Axis defences. The acting commander and his chief staff officer, Oberstleutnant Siegfried Westphal, after discussions with Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, drafted plans on 25 October for counter-attacks that would, by their nature, lose the Panzerarmee one of the few potential advantages it still had. So far, the Axis armour had largely stood off at long range in action against the British armour. Whilst they could no longer expect to win even these long-range duels they could, by prolonging the battle, weaken their opponents, preserve their own strength and buy time.

  The three counter-attacks they launched that day produced disproportionate Axis tank casualties in which the 6-pounder anti-tank guns had their chance to shine. Tank loss rates in Divisione ‘Littorio’ and particularly 15. Panzer-Division (which had only thirty-two tanks left by 26 October) were unsustainable.76 The beginnings of a real crisis for the Panzerarmee had, paradoxically, been prompted by the actions of the Axis commanders.

  That same evening, the order was finally given for the withdrawal of 131st Brigade – but only after eighteen hours of being ‘shot up’ by Italian mortars and artillery. The ‘Folgore’ paratroops had proved too tough to crack and the Panzerarmee’s desert flank remained intact. The unlucky Colonel Gibbs and some of his men were taken prisoner, and left contemplating what might have been:

  If only our armour had managed to follow us, the battle down on this Southern Flank would have been highly successful. Yet it was for us a most dispiriting experience and left one wondering about what had ‘gone wrong’. At the same time, one was thankful to be alive when so many others were not, or were badly wounded, and I began to work out how to make the best of a poor situation.77

  Conditions for the men in the exposed prisoner of war ‘cage’ were austere, and that evening news filtered through of a significant development in the battle. Gibbs continued:

  The desert nights at the end of October are cold compared to the intense heat of the burning sun by day which we had experienced during those hours of daylight prior to our ‘rounding up’, as it were. On that first night one had only khaki shirt and shorts, and the one blanket provided by the Germans was not proof against the extreme chilliness of the night. The German sentries were fairly ‘cock-a-hoop’ because, they said, Rommel, who had been in Germany ill, was now back in the Desert in command of his Armies. Hence, they declared, the British would be once more and finally ‘on the run’. So we pulled their legs as best we could in the kind of half guttural pigeon English with which they addressed us, and then we lay down on the sand again and gazed at the starry desert night, which seemed strange enough from inside a large wire enclosure.78

  News of the Generalfeldmarschall’s return on the evening of 25 October had travelled fast. Its effect on Axis morale was obvious.

  How ironic, therefore, that among Rommel’s first actions on his return was his decision to continue the armoured counter-attacks ordered by von Thoma. He also brought 90. leichte-Afrika-Division and Divisione ‘Trieste’ up to co-operate. This was in spite of the fact that he was acutely aware that sufficient supplies of fuel for his army’s vehicles were still not getting through. By committing to further armoured attacks, he was using up vital fuel reserves for his tanks. His anger at his Italian allies over this situation should not disguise that he himself could have done more to reduce the effects of the fuel shortage. The first attacks at dawn once again involved Divisione ‘Littorio’ and 15. Panzer-Division, but supported by the concentrated fire of all available Axis artillery. Eighth Army countered with artillery DF concentrations which severely disrupted the preparations and delayed the attack, which was consequently broken up quite easily. More attempts were made and countered by artillery or tanks. Capitano Davide Beretta’s unit, 554o Gruppo Semoventi da 75/18 from Divisione ‘Littorio’, equipped with the Semovente self-propelled gun, took part in a further, larger battle later that day.

  In front of our Semoventi there were some tens of M14 tanks of Littorio Division that were firing their 47/32 guns against some enemy anti-tank positions. Suddenly on the horizon there appeared overwhelming formations of heavy British tanks, Shermans and Grants, aiming their 75mm guns like hunters. Sometimes they stopped their advance, and then continued forward. Our tiny M14/41s moved towards them to shorten the range – the shorter the range, the better the chances of penetrating their armour with their small guns. The British were about 1,500m from our tanks and began to put up a rapid fire. We observed this action with dismay, because the 47mm shells of the M14s were bouncing off the heavy armour of their tanks. We were confident, however, that our own 75mm guns would have a very different effect on the British. ‘Watch out, they’re advancing towards us!’ ‘Tally Ho!’ We started to advance as well, and we reached our blazing M14s with guns ready! ‘Range 700, 800, 900… Fire!’… We managed to destroy some Shermans and Grants, and the British halted their advance and tried to attack our flanks. We barely managed to stop their advance, and failed to force them to withdraw; but it was a miracle indeed that we stopped them. In the evening we counted twenty Shermans and Grants and some Valentines and Crusaders destroyed; but the price we paid in that uneven battle was far too high.79

  Cold statistics explained why the Panzerarmee could not continue indefinitely, but the British High Command did not know with certainty whether or not the defenders were buying time until reinforcements and supplies were dispatched by Hitler and Mussolini – although nothing from Ultra suggested this.

  During the night, Rommel’s forces suffered a further blow when 2/48th Australian Infantry Battalion captured the tactically important Point 29 in a lightning-fast assault, strongly supported by six Field and two Medium artillery regiments, and which used the battalion’s carriers in quickly seizing the final objective from Panzergrenadier-Regiment 125. The capture of sketch maps of the German minefie
ld defences, the Panzergrenadier-Regiment commander and one of his battalion commanders, immediately prior to the attack was fortunate but, although the attacks of both 2/48th and 2/24th were successful, both suffered heavily in their attacks. On 26 October these battalions were under intense artillery fire for three hours but any attack on them was largely snuffed out by more British DF fire.

  The pressure was building on Rommel’s forces as the losses in men and tanks mounted. Bringing 21. Panzer-Division and Divisione ‘Ariete’ northwards looked an increasingly necessary, but perhaps (given his fuel reserves) irrevocable, option. On the other hand, for the time being Montgomery could maintain Horrocks’ XIII Corps in the south without prejudice to his northern operation. Furthermore, even as the Axis armour was engaged in self-immolating attacks on the British tank units in, or beyond, the minefields, the Eighth Army’s commander and chief of staff were contemplating a radical change in direction and tempo for operations. It was clear that the initiative still rested with Montgomery, despite the best efforts of Thoma and Rommel.

  CHAPTER EIGHT

  ATTRITION

  On the morning of 26 October Eighth Army’s lack of significant progress in the ‘crumbling’ operations after the initial assault was clear. The Army Commander used much of the day to assimilate information from Brigadier Freddie de Guingand, his Chief of Staff and others on the state of his forces. When he had done so, three important points were plain.

  The first related to the armour. Whatever Montgomery’s opinion of his armoured formations’ performance in the fighting so far, it was clear that tank casualties had been higher than he might have assumed. Having begun the battle with 1,060 tanks of all types, he now had 754 available. But Guingand recognized that, crucially, the majority of tanks had suffered damage from mines rather than enemy shells. Damaged tracks and wheels could be repaired or replaced by the very efficient tank workshops in a relatively short period of time. Guingand estimated, consequently, that a daily flow of forty to fifty tanks might be expected to be returned for further use in the fighting. The arithmetic of attrition was not yet, therefore, suggesting that Eighth Army need terminate, or even limit, its offensive operations.