El Alamein Read online

  General Gott was in his Armoured Command Vehicle (ACV), the first I had seen. He came out at once and walked a few yards clear of it. ‘Inglis has gone to Cairo’, he said, and handed me a letter. It was a short note from General Corbett… I remember very clearly the opening sentence: ‘The Chief has decided to save Eighth Army.’ The note then went on to say that the South Africans would retire through Alexandria and the rest of us down the desert road through Cairo. I asked what was meant by the first sentence. ‘It means what it says – he means to save the Field Army,’ the General said. 15

  Gott interpreted the order as an indication that a general retirement and evacuation of Egypt was being contemplated. The justification for his view is unclear, and may have had more to do with his state of mind after the recent events involving the New Zealand Division, as indicated by his response to Kippenberger’s vehement demonstration of ‘fight’:

  I protested that we were perfectly fit to fight and that it was criminal to give up Egypt to 25,000 German troops and a hundred tanks (disregarding the Italians) – the latest Intelligence estimate – and to lose as helpless prisoners perhaps 200,000 Base troops. Strafer replied sadly that NZ Division was battle-worthy but very few other people were and he feared the worst.16

  Gott, by reputation supposedly unflappable, was certainly not the only senior commander to be viewing events in an extremely pessimistic light at this time. Major-General Dan Pienaar, the commander of 2nd South African Division, was especially voluble and bleak in his opinions, according to Lieutenant-General Sir Willoughby Norrie, the General Officer Commanding XXX Corps:

  Pienaar was openly saying that he thought it was wrong to stand at El Alamein, and that the best place was to go behind the Suez Canal. Even allowing for Pienaar’s well-known exaggeration of speech, these expressions were a source of considerable embarrassment, both to the Commander-in-Chief and myself.17

  Kippenberger’s confusion actually arose from the question of whether Corbett’s memo was at variance with the very clear instructions he had already received on 29 June. Kippenberger recorded:

  We were told that Eighth Army would stand and fight on the Alamein line, which ran from the sea to where the Taqa plateau overlooked the impassable Qattara Depression… There was no fear of being outflanked. We heard that 1 South African Division under Dan Pienaar was holding the Alamein Box in the north and that an Indian brigade was in the Deir el Shein Box with 50 Division Group in a near position. Then came 2 NZ Division and south of us on the Taqa plateau was another Indian brigade. The armour was in support and the leading Australian brigade from Syria had arrived at Amiriya. In addition there were a number of ‘Jock’ columns, at this time called ‘Monthly’ columns, between us and the plateau. We made contact with ‘June’, ‘July’, and ‘August’. They were each composed of a battery of twenty-five-pounders and a company of motorized infantry and, acting independently as they usually did, had little fighting and no stopping value whatever. Nor could we ever find out where they were, which would have been annoying if they had been serious fighting troops. The whole position looked weak but it was reasonable to suppose that the enemy was getting weary and he was certainly at the end of a terrific line of supply.18

  This was a clear reflection of information communicated from Auchinleck to his Eighth Army command. There should have been no doubt about the decision to stand and fight.

  However, although the opinions and doubts of some senior commanders had a corrosive influence on some men’s morale in the forward areas, they were not the cause of another crisis in morale that was arising. This became known as the ‘Cairo Flap’ and was almost as much a product of the determined steps Auchinleck was taking to resolve the military crisis as it was a consequence of Rommel’s success.

  It was ironic, but the ‘Cairo Flap’ probably began in Alexandria. The Royal Navy took the cautious step of evacuating the Mediterranean Fleet from the port on 28 June. This news and the subsequent lootings convinced large numbers of people that Rommel’s arrival in the city was imminent. This was compounded by the large numbers of troops passing eastwards and westwards through Alexandria in particular. Whilst many ancillary units such as workshops, supply companies, administrative, engineering and other troops not expected to bear arms in the front line were being evacuated, a number of reinforcement units were being sent forward for the defence. This created a sense of terrific confusion with troops everywhere and crowds milling at railway stations, in the already-crowded streets and on the main roads. There were many amongst the Egyptian population who had hoped to see the end of a British presence and nationalist groups did what they could to encourage the disorder and sense of panic. The most notable signs of panic were the actions of some government offices and military headquarters. On Wednesday 1 July, Brigadier George Davy returning from Eighth Army Headquarters to Middle East General Headquarters (GHQ) in Cairo witnessed an unusual sight:

  As I approached GHQ, I saw clouds of smouldering paper fragments in the air and fluttering down like black snow. It was carried on a light breeze in a broad belt and deposited over the streets of several square miles of Cairo. I sent for Douglas Packard and asked what it was all about. He said that the embassy had started burning their secret documents and that the CGS, at the morning conference, had ordered that all secret documents in GHQ were to be burned at once.19

  The orders seem to have originated with Sir Richard Casey, the Minister of State, and the British Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, but military personnel at GHQ were involved too. With sardonic humour, the day became known as ‘Ash Wednesday’. This was all a source of great amusement at the front, where, despite flagging morale, most men responded with a grim determination to defeat Rommel now that a stand was being made.

  In many standard military histories, the whole situation is usually portrayed as a jolly farce based on false rumours and British incompetence. It was, for large numbers of people, rather more a real threat to life and limb. For lurking behind the Axis forces in this supposed ‘War without Hate’ between the Panzerarmee and Eighth Army was very real hatred. Even as plans were made for the advance on Cairo, an SS Einsatzkommando was created to murder tens of thousands of Jews who lived in Egypt.20

  On the last days of June, significant reinforcements arrived to boost the resources at Auchinleck’s disposal. The first were from 18th Indian Brigade, who, having been rushed over to North Africa from Mosul and attached to 10th Indian Division, had only two days to prepare an additional ‘box’ at Deir el Shein. This was because XXX Corps’ commander, Norrie, was worried about the width of the gaps between the existing boxes. Deir el Shein was halfway between Alamein and Bab el Qattara.

  The brigade was made up of 2/3rd Gurkhas, 4/11th Sikhs and 2/5th Essex Regiment. It had no desert experience and only one battalion had seen combat. Their hasty transfer from Iraq meant they were disorganized, having lost their brigade commander and their organic artillery regiment. This had been made good by odds and sods of field and anti-tank guns by XXX Corps’ artillery commander, Brigadier Mead Dennis, but the field guns were from several regiments and their fire could not be co-ordinated. Meanwhile, the infantry had discovered what a difficult position they had been selected to defend, as Private Arthur Page of 2/5th Essex reported:

  After being allocated to our positions, we dug ourselves in as best we could, but not far underneath the sand were shelves of rock. We were given very little time to prepare so it was extremely hard work. Everything was hurried. We even had our kitbags with us.21

  Only the fact that this was a small depression with raised lips offered any real protection.

  By comparison, the move of 9th Australian Division from Syria was well managed – except for efforts to maintain secrecy by hiding the national identity of the men. Warrant Officer Eric Watts of 2/12th Field Regiment remembered:

  The captain in charge of the troop ordered a parade and told everybody that there was a move and it was going to happen in the next twenty-four hours. They had to
take all the signs indicating that they were the Australian 9th Division off the trucks, guns and anything that indicated that we were Australian had to be done away with – all the signs. We weren’t allowed to wear our slouch hats on the move and we moved within twenty-four hours of being told this. But only one little point had been forgotten. Australians were the only troops who wore tan boots. All the other British troops wore black boots. But we wore tan boots. Well, it didn’t take anyone long to wake up to this and they knew and they used to sing out ‘Aussie, Aussie’ and this sort of stuff as we were travelling through their villages and everything. So that was our top secret move – it was a bit botched really.22

  The Australians would not arrive until 4 or 5 July, which meant they could not take part in the critical opening phase of the defensive battle. Dorman-Smith had specified that, if necessary, they would be used with 1st South African Division in defence around Alexandria. Wherever they were to be deployed the response was typified by the resolute Corporal Ray Middleton of 2/28th Battalion:

  Well, somebody’s got to stop the bastard. We can prove we’ve done it before, and we can do it again. The way we saw it, we’re in desperate straits. If they’ve got to call on the Australians, alright, we’ll show them. It’s clean muck and stop that. Then we can go home.23

  On 30 June Auchinleck issued an exhortation to his men prior to what he knew would be a crucial fight. Whilst its effects on Eighth Army morale have been doubted, this message was uncannily accurate concerning his opponent in stating ‘the enemy is stretching to his limits and thinks we are a broken army. His tactics against the New Zealanders were poor in the extreme. He hopes to take Egypt by bluff. Show him where he gets off.’ 24 The fighting in the last ten days of June had taken a heavy toll on the Panzerarmee and, in particular, the Afrika Korps. Rommel had fifty-five German tanks in total, with perhaps 500 infantry for each of the two divisions. 90. leichte-Afrika-Division possessed fewer than 1,100 infantry. The Germans had 330 guns of all types, including thirty-nine captured British 25-pounders and twenty-nine 88mm guns. The Italians, with only thirty, actually possessed fewer serviceable tanks, 5,500 infantry and 200 guns.25

  Rommel attempted to marginalize these shortcomings with a display of confidence and ambitious plans. The latter, outlined to his commanders on 30 June, was based on splitting the two corps facing him and getting behind the British defences, at which point experience suggested the British would collapse. The Italian XXI Corpo d’Armata would ‘pin’ the defenders of the Alamein Box. Divisione ‘Littorio’, which had been mauled by the hastily retreating 1st Armoured Division and had lost heavily in tanks, was to be bolstered by two units of 88mm guns before tackling 1st Armoured (believed to be in front of the Bab el Qattara Box) again. The 10th Indian Brigade in a box at Deir el Abyad was to be bypassed as the Afrika Korps with Divisioni ‘Ariete’ and ‘Trieste’ thrust through the centre of the British positions before turning to attack the New Zealanders in the Bab el Qattara Box. This was all to be followed by a triumphal drive on Alexandria.

  These plans were full of intelligence errors, false optimism and high expectations. The identification and positioning of several units was wrong – partly in misplacing 1st Armoured Division but especially in relation to 18th Indian Brigade. The armoured units were expected to capture the necessary fuel to reach Alexandria and the mere presence of der Wüstenfuchs amongst them was presumed enough to scatter the Eighth Army, like chickens, and put them to flight. Rommel and his forces were still confident that they had smashed the Eighth Army and expected to be able to break through what resistance remained, despite tiredness amongst all ranks.

  The first exchanges at Alamein began on 30 June 1942 when 90. leichte-Afrika-Division came into sight on the coast road near Tel el Eisa and exchanged fire with South African Artillery stationed outside the Alamein Box. This and 1st Armoured’s clash with ‘Littorio’ aside, there was something of a hush as the armies closed with each other. Eighth Army was warned that the anticipated attack would begin on 1 July. Auchinleck, meanwhile, finalized his plans. He expected XXX Corps units in and around the Alamein and Deir el Shein positions to hold the Axis advance, allowing XIII Corps in the shape of 1st Armoured (actually to the south-east of the Alamein Box) and New Zealand Divisions to strike from the south against Rommel’s right flank. There was no suggestion of withdrawal in his mind. Early on the morning of 1 July, he wrote a brief note of these ideas. His first stated purpose was crucial: ‘I intend to defeat the enemy and destroy him’.26

  During the night, the Afrika Korps advance had been confused and disorganized so that, at dawn, they were still not ready to attack. This was the time for the attack against the Alamein Box by Divisione ‘Trento’ to begin and 90. leichte’Afrika-Division’s advance was supposed to start. The latter was soon halted by fire from the Alamein Box, which prevented further forward movement all morning until a sandstorm allowed a withdrawal. Only at 0645hrs did General der Panzertruppe Walther Nehring’s men advance and that was after enduring a heavy bombing raid. At about 1000hrs their approach was seen from Deir el Shein and soon afterwards the position was shelled by artillery. After about an hour a bren gun carrier approached the 2/5th Essex under a white flag. The occupants were two supposedly British soldiers with no badges of rank sent by the Germans to encourage surrender to prevent further losses. The words used to dismiss this suggestion have clearly been sanitized in every account with only ‘Stick it up and be damned’ offering a clue to the real terminology employed.27

  This unexpected opposition gave Nehring a dilemma as he could not leave Deir el Shein untaken as the Afrika Korps pursued its primary objective. He chose to eliminate the Indian brigade. During the whole day 18th Indian Brigade was under attack and stubborn resistance delayed and prevented the Axis breakthrough and frustrated their whole plan. At 1130hrs Schützen-Regiment 104 deployed under long-range covering fire from the few Panzer IVs they had and moved to the attack but were repeatedly beaten back by the Essex and Gurkhas, eventually finding a gap close to the former’s B Echelon. Lieutenant-Colonel Steve May of 2/5th Essex recalled:

  At this time every available man, cooks, mess staff, clerks, MT [Motor Transport] personnel and QM [Quarter Master] and his staff were firing steadily and there is no doubt they took steady toll of infantry who tried to force a gap. Towards 1300 hours the ammunition situation was getting desperate and finally the enemy got a lodgement, blew the wire and forced a gap, and exploited it with tanks. However, he had not had it all his own way. The 25-pounders had some excellent targets, some at point-blank range.28

  The brigade had nine Matilda ‘infantry’ tanks in support. These offered determined resistance too but armed only with 2-pounder guns, they were no match for the Panzers. The Sikhs, who had now been subjected to heavy attack, were driven from their positions and forced to surrender and, by 1900hrs, it was all over. The circumstances of Private Arthur Page’s surrender must have seemed strangely familiar to many who were taken prisoner in the two wars against Germany:

  By evening all of our battalion were captured. One of our officers told us to come out of the trenches with our hands up. We were, as the saying went, ‘in the bag’, slang for Prisoner of War. ‘For you, the war is over,’ a German said to us.29

  The destruction of 18th Indian Brigade was complete, but in accomplishing it, the Afrika Korps had suffered significant losses in armour and elsewhere things unravelled rapidly too. Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin described the situation:

  We lost eighteen tanks out of fifty-five, and the fighting edge of the Afrika Korps was finally blunted. 90. leichte advanced during the afternoon, and attempted to bypass the El Alamein Box; it ran into a crescent of fire from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd South African Brigades and their supporting artillery, and was thrown into confusion not far removed from panic. Rommel himself went to 90. leichte to try and urge the division forward but the volume of fire was so heavy that even he was pinned down.30

  Von Mellenthin recognized the significan
ce of this hold-up: ‘Our prospects of victory were hopelessly prejudiced on 1 July. Our one chance was to outmanoeuvre the enemy, but we had actually been drawn into a battle of attrition’.31 For Rommel, 90. leichte-Afrika-Division’s crisis must surely have brought home to him the extent to which his plans for the day had failed when he decided to put everything into supporting this effort by using his Gefechtsstaffel in conjunction with Kampfgruppe Kiehl. Rommel recorded:

  Furious artillery fire again struck into our ranks. British shells came streaming in from three directions, north, east and south; anti-aircraft tracer streaked through our force. Under this tremendous weight of fire, our attack came to a standstill. Hastily we scattered our vehicles and took cover, as shell after shell crashed into the area we were holding. For two hours Bayerlein and I had to lie out in the open. Suddenly to add to our troubles, a powerful British bomber force came flying up towards us. Fortunately, it was turned back before it reached us by some German fighters who had been escorting a dive-bomber raid.32

  It was indeed fortunate that the Luftwaffe fighters saved Rommel since his units were still complaining of the air arm’s absence over the battlefield.33 Slowly, this was being rectified but the Desert Air Force still maintained the ascendancy for the moment.

  Rommel’s descriptions of the power of the artillery bombardment give some clue to the cause of 90. leichte-Afrika-Division’s crisis in morale. Apart from the South African Field Regiments in the Alamein Box, the heavier guns of 7th Medium Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Toc’ Elton were also present. Elton had already embarked on re-educating his gunners to tried-and-tested techniques which fitted closely with Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith’s aim for improving the artillery’s effectiveness, as one of his officers, Lieutenant Charles Westlake, noted: