El Alamein Read online

  His idea was to have a concentration of all artillery that could reach certain targets so that you brought a massive firepower to bear coming from various directions and by this means you were pretty well sure of destroying the target.34

  This simple, but effective, technique now became a possibility in a defended locale like the Alamein Box and an early version was employed on 1 July.

  The attack on 1 July had not produced the victory Rommel needed but buoyed by aerial reconnaissance reports of the British Eastern Mediterranean Fleet’s departure from Alexandria, he determined on a further effort. Auchinleck, who throughout the day had been plagued by communication problems and particularly the frustrating experience of being unable to contact one of his corps commanders (Gott again), was relieved when the latter appeared at his headquarters. This enabled him to deliver plans for a more compact defence of his positions, abandoning the boxes at Bab el Qattara and Naqb abu Dweis. He hoped to meet Rommel’s expected second effort with a counter-attack by XIII Corps. However, Gott’s forces were separated and fragmenting still further with the creation and deployment of ‘mobile artillery battle-groups’ – which Auchinleck had intended for use in ‘fluid defence’ to preserve his limited numbers of tanks for use at critical moments. These formations appeared to be ‘Jock Columns’ in all but name and to have the same weaknesses i.e. they could not, in Auchinleck’s opinion of their predecessor, ‘press home an attack against anything but very weak opposition’.35

  Despite enjoying a peaceful night and the opportunity to recover, 90. leichte-Afrika-Division was soon under heavy fire again when trying to go forward. Rommel therefore decided to reinforce it with an Afrika Korps attack striking east and then north around Alam el Onsol. Now both formations were subjected to more air attacks by formations of fifteen, eighteen or even twenty-one bombers with fighter protection. 90. leichte-Afrika-Division was now thoroughly demoralized. Meanwhile the Afrika Korps struck resistance first from 1st South African Brigade and then from a column from 10th Indian Division, called ‘Robcol’ after its commander, Brigadier Robert Waller.36 There followed a heated argument between Pienaar on behalf of 1st South African Brigade and Norrie, his superior, over the South African commander’s insistence on the brigade being withdrawn after both its brigadier and brigade-major were wounded. Norrie reluctantly acceded.

  ‘Robcol’ consisted of two companies of 1/4th Essex, three platoons of Northumberland Fusiliers, two batteries from 11th (HAC) Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery and 11th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery. According to Cyril Mount:

  Some intelligence must have come through that we were going to take the brunt of the attack and this column was very hastily formed by Waller with the 1/4th Essex as the main fighting unit. There were no other fighting units at that moment there, just the 11th and the Essex. We still had OPs [observation posts] on Ruweisat Ridge and we were firing on observed targets from Ruweisat Ridge. We weren’t defending the ridge, we were on the left of the ridge. The orders were that we were to hold that line where the main prod was coming from the Germans.37

  Fierce action began after the sudden retirement of the artillery OPs from Ruweisat Ridge, as Mount related:

  German tanks had occupied the western end of the ridge and the OPs came hurtling back, tearing back, zig-zagging across the gravelly flat stuff and being shot at by tanks. From then on there were no OPs. It was direct firing over open sights. The whole regiment was in. 83rd and 85th were forward and they took the full brunt of it. My battery was maybe 400 yards out to the left and rear. I was in the waggon lines. I was helping to load ammunition into the 3-tonners. The 3-tonners were taking ammunition up to the guns and dumping it and food was taken up. We could see what was going on – about 200 or 300 yards ahead of us. We were getting a lot of ‘overs’ from these tanks – they were firing at the guns. There were casualties coming back. It was just total pandemonium and chaos. We were expecting all the time to be overrun. There was damn all we could do about it. The guns were tackling the tanks.38

  It was not a wholly uncommon experience for Field and Horse Artillery regiments of Eighth Army equipped with 25-pounders to find themselves isolated and overrun by Axis armour during the Desert War. A typical incident was the destruction of 107 (South Nottinghamshire Hussars Yeomanry) Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery during the Gazala battle on 6 June 1942.39 However, on this occasion, guns of the same type, operating in the open desert against the same enemy, halted their opponent’s advance. Mount continued:

  The gun positions weren’t overrun but a whole troop, E Troop, was lost and it was re-formed from stragglers that came from other regiments. It was lost to tank fire and small arms fire. The tanks were quite close but a hell of a lot were knocked out. They eventually withdrew. Had they broken through, they would have gone on straight through.40

  There were three crucial differences on this occasion. Firstly, the attacking forces were a great deal weaker than at Gazala and did not have the advantage of surprise – although 11th Field Regiment still suffered almost one-third casualties. Secondly, the defenders enjoyed considerably more air support than on the previous occasion. Thirdly, Auchinleck’s ‘mobile artillery battle groups’ as indicated by their name had the 25-pounder batteries at their heart and, with more batteries attached, could concentrate more firepower than the ‘Jock Columns’. This made them more appropriate for the fluid defensive battle now being fought by Eighth Army around the Ruweisat Ridge. There was a difference between the two ad hoc formations after all.

  Nevertheless, ‘Robcol’ would have been overrun if it had not been for the arrival of 22nd and 4th Armoured Brigades who clashed with tanks from 21. Panzer-Division and 15. Panzer-Division respectively. There was an element of ‘smoke and mirrors’ illusion behind the armoured brigades’ deployment and particularly the use of the 6-pounder anti-tank guns the brigade had had since Gazala. Now, as Private Laurie Phillips of 1st Rifle Brigade, 22nd Armoured Brigade, recalled, they were to be employed in an unusual way:

  Because of the shortage of tanks they decided to use us as ‘armour’; with the guns up ‘on portee’. We reversed into action alongside the tanks. Because there was a lot of soft sand in the area where we were operating, south of Ruweisat, we had Honey tanks standing by to tow us out if we got stuck and Crusaders to bring us up ammunition and petrol. We put in an attack in the afternoon and met the 21st Panzer Division head on as it advanced to attack us; we fired over 100 rounds with our gun (we had to pull back for more after we had used the 70 we carried) and it got pretty hot.41

  THE FIRST BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN

  The advantages of the 6-pounder anti-tank gun over its predecessor were ably demonstrated on Ruweisat Ridge. Lance Corporal Douglas Waller, also of 1st Rifle Brigade, described the benefits:

  With a 6-pounder you definitely had a chance as long as you could hit them [i.e. tanks] in the side or the back. Not too much if you hit them on the front. A 2-pounder would knock out an Italian M13 but it wouldn’t touch a Mark III or Mark IV. You could knock them out with a 6-pdr, but a 2-pdr was hopeless. If you get them side-on or even partially side-on. You’re not likely to get one at the back unless it swung round. You aimed at side-on, because the front had reinforced plate in front of it. If you couldn’t get a side-on, you aimed for the turret, below the gun because there was a chance that if you hit it, it would dip down and it was not so thick there or at least it would cause flakes of metal to fly off inside the tank and at least put the gunner out of action.42

  By the end of the day, the two Panzer units possessed a total of only 26 tanks between them.43 A good percentage of the casualties were due to the 6-pounders. This demonstration of the gun’s capabilities certainly boosted morale – as did the arrival of the 6-pounder generally, for which men were prepared to forgive a great deal. As one sergeant in another anti-tank regiment pointed out: ‘The 6-pounders were there – that was the important thing. The fact that they weren’t polished and finished and you could cut your hands on the raw welding d
idn’t really matter. We’d got them’.44

  On 3 July, a resumption of the Afrika Korps attack was ordered by Rommel with Divisione ‘Ariete’ and ‘Littorio’ on its southern flank. Meanwhile 27a Divisione Autotrasportabile ‘Brescia’ was to hold El Mreir. This time the British armoured brigades were awaiting the attack and were ready. After an hour and a half of fighting, the Axis forces were driven off with the Panzer units again complaining of lack of air and artillery support.

  Twenty M14/41 tanks of XII Battaglione Carri of ‘Littorio’ also advanced on British positions on Ruweisat Ridge, but ran into opposition. Tenente Armando Luciano was in one of them:

  We’re lined up facing east, with the sun blinding us and making our tank armour shine. In the distance in front of us, I can make out the silhouettes of the enemy tanks backed up against a large mound of earth. This is it – the moment of our first combat has come. Maggiore dell’Uva gives the final orders, the battalion advances to get in range, then the exchange of fire starts and tank platoons start moving. At the same time we are bombarded with enemy artillery fire, which gets more and more frequent and well-aimed.45

  The Italian tanks had always struggled to compete with Eighth Army’s armour. Now Luciano’s men had another shock, confirming the information provided by those who have already been in combat:

  In the distance in front of me I make out an enemy tank flying a pennant from its radio antenna; it must be a command tank… ‘Halt!’ I cry to Ramazzotti, ‘Aim 600, fire!’ Following the trail of the tracer, I see the shell hit the enemy armour, but I wait in vain for the usual black smoke of burning fuel to pour from the tank, or to see the crew throw themselves out of the vehicle. Our armour-piercing shell must have misfired – it is probably an American Grant tank, a beast with too thick a skin. I try again with another armour-piercing shell, but almost simultaneously I feel a blow on our right flank and hear the screams of the radio operator who seems to be going mad and whom Vizentini, the gunner, is trying to calm down. The tank has taken a hit, fortunately not a direct hit, but on its right side, on the track, which is now hanging uselessly while the exchange of fire is getting more intense and other tanks are being destroyed.46

  Now, the few remaining tanks of ‘Ariete’ were attacked by 4th Armoured Brigade, whilst ‘Trieste’, the right flank guard to ‘Ariete’, was pinned down by incessant air attacks. They offered a superb target for the New Zealand artillery which pounded the Italians. A ‘silent’ attack by infantry from 19th Battalion of 4th New Zealand Brigade overran the positions held by the Bersaglieri of ‘Ariete’ and captured 350 men and forty-four assorted guns, including twelve 105mm, eleven 88mm, sixteen 75mm, five captured 25-pounder guns, some 20mm infantry guns and mortars and 100 assorted motor vehicles, for the loss of two killed and twenty wounded.47

  It was these losses that finally convinced Rommel of the need to call off his attacks for the time being. Low on both fuel and ammunition and over 1,400 miles from Tripoli, its main supply port, the Panzerarmee needed time to regroup, and to collect reinforcements and supplies. Although Stukas had now reappeared in the skies over the Eighth Army, any pause would offer a chance to get more Luftwaffe support forward. However, given the original premise on which Rommel had, firstly, gone into Egypt and, secondly, attacked the Alamein positions – neither of which he was obliged to do – it was questionable whether any further opportunity would be offered. In all probability, the situation before Gazala occurred to him. Then the British had raced to gather their forces and mass supplies and ammunition ready for an attack, only to be pre-empted by Rommel. It would, however, take a long time to recover the Panzerarmee’s strength. Rommel indulged in some bitter remarks regarding the performance of his Italian ally, complaining that the losses in ‘Ariete’ had occurred without the division offering any real resistance. He subsequently admitted, however, that he had demanded too much from the Italians, whose equipment in all areas except artillery was no match for that of his German units.

  In the meantime, Auchinleck had correctly detected the change in his opponent’s stance and issued orders for preparation to pursue, presuming that Rommel would need to withdraw because of his very vulnerable supply route. If no retirement occurred, it would be Auchinleck who would have the initiative. On 4 July, Auchinleck could truly claim to have defeated his enemy’s designs on Egypt, Cairo and Suez. However the victory was not a decisive one; Rommel had only been forced onto the defensive. This was like the 1916 naval battle of Jutland, where Jellicoe had, by the very act of not losing, frustrated German plans for the destruction of the Royal Navy’s main fleet, which was an essential prerequisite for invading Britain. The German Hochseeflotte (High Seas Fleet) could make repeated attempts to destroy the Grand Fleet; Jellicoe need only lose once to jeopardize Britain’s chances of victory. Auchinleck, however, wanted a definite victory and now set to making plans to secure it.

  * The Axis forces referred to this position as the Qaret el Abd.

  CHAPTER THREE

  DIMINISHING RETURNS

  On the morning of 4 July 1942 the Panzerarmee Afrika was in great danger. Its main attacking force, the Afrika Korps, had only thirty-six tanks in running order and no more than a few hundred exhausted infantry. The non-motorized units of its Italian allies were still in fair shape but not yet in the front line whilst Divisione ‘Littorio’ and, more particularly, Divisione ‘Ariete’, had suffered heavy casualties. The latter reportedly had only five M14 tanks and two field guns left after the New Zealand assault on the previous day. Fortunately for Rommel, given the need for defensive action, his artillery (both Italian and German) was otherwise still strong and a number of captured British guns were being used. German guns were very low on ammunition but 1,500 captured 25-pounder rounds were found in Deir el Shein, and the Italians had some reserve stocks. There was no doubt amongst some on his staff that the Axis forces could not have resisted a determined attack by Eighth Army and there was relief that the Panzerarmee survived the day ‘with no real damage except to our nerves.’1 This was despite a crisis for 15. Panzer-Division caused by a shortage of ammunition and confusion over the supposed surrender of 600 men of Schützen-Regiment 115.2 On 5 July there was still little belief amongst Eighth Army that Auchinleck would have the temerity to attempt serious counter-attacks against the man whose reputation was such that every rumour now referred to ‘Rommel’ as opposed to ‘the enemy’ or ‘the Germans and Italians’, as in ‘Rommel will be in Cairo in a week’. There was no clear point for the fighting troop at which they were able to see that they had actually defeated the intentions of their ‘invincible’ opponent. There were no two ‘halves’ of the First Battle of El Alamein. There are some who argued later that there was not even a battle that was ‘First Alamein’.3

  Eighth Army was bolstered on this day by the arrival and deployment of 9th Australian Division, but only after a dispute between Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Morshead, the divisional commander, and Auchinleck. The Australian commander refused to detach brigades from his command to form the ‘mobile artillery battle-groups’ Auchinleck favoured for infantry formations. Morshead invoked the rights of a ‘Commonwealth commander’ in refusing to co-operate with a policy which he disliked, only accepting a temporary detachment of 24th Australian Infantry Brigade to positions on Ruweisat Ridge after tough negotiations. This was the only one of his brigades trained in mobile operations, which was how Auchinleck hoped it would be used.4 Lance Corporal Phil Loffman, 2/28th Battalion, remembered the preparations:

  We were full of confidence. Actually, as the South Africans were retreating, they were saying ‘Oh, Aussie, you’re gonna get cleaned up, you’re gonna get cleaned up’. They were disheartened and demoralized and they were a bad influence on the diggers. I didn’t want them talking to our blokes because they were just gloom and doom. We were full of fight at that stage of the game.5

  The Australians were unaware of the South Africans’ involvement in the fighting of the previous days. Their opinions on the
South African forces as a whole were now coloured by their unchangeable view that it was the South Africans who had lost Tobruk after they themselves had held it for so long in the siege. There was, on the other hand, admiration for their British counterparts and a feeling of mutual respect, as Private Peter Salmon, also of 2/28th Battalion, recalled:

  We always complained, we Australians, about our conditions but the British troops really their rations and things were a lot worse than ours. The morale amongst the British troops was extremely high. There was a tremendous lot of admiration for them. They were very good soldiers, wonderful soldiers, a lot of those British battalions. A lot of Australians, of course, called the British soldiers ‘Poms’, but it’s in many cases an affectionate term. I think we generally had an admiration for each other really. There was never any bad feeling between ourselves and the British soldiers. Far from it.6

  On 6 July Rommel continued to regroup his forces, laying mines to strengthen his front. The still-fragile 90. leichte-Afrika-Division received reinforcements and the number of tanks in the Afrika Korps rose to forty-four thanks to reinforcements and recoveries. This permitted the formation of a small mobile reserve. The great opportunity for destroying the Panzerarmee had passed, but Auchinleck rightly retained belief in the possibility of defeating his opponent given the steady and strong stream of reinforcements now arriving in the Middle East and coming forward to the front line. He, therefore, planned and gave orders accordingly.